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Abstract
We develop a theoretical model that replicates three observed phenomena in secu-
rities markets: serial correlation in trades; serial correlation in squared price changes
(conditional heteroskedasticity); and more persistent serial correlation in trades than
in squared price changes. In the model exogenous news is captured by signals that
informed agents receive. Agents trade anonymously through a market specialist, who
does not receive a signal. We show that entry and exit of informed traders following
the arrival of news produces serial correlation in the number of trades and serial cor-
relation in squared price changes. Because the bid-ask spread of the market specialist
tends to shrink as individuals trade and reveal their information, the serial correlation
in trades is more persistent than the serial correlation in squared price changes.
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11 Introduction
Many asset prices exhibit conditional heteroskedasticity through serial correlation in squared
price changes. Statistical models that ¯t the observed serial correlation in squared price
changes are now widely used in empirical ¯nance.1 Modeling serial correlation in squared
price changes has important implications for option pricing and conditional return forecast-
ing. Accurate speci¯cation of a statistical model requires knowledge of an economic model
that explains why serial correlation is present. Although there is widespread speculation
that the arrival of news in ¯nancial markets has an important impact on squared price
changes, we know of no economic model that links the arrival of news to serial correlation
in squared price changes. We provide an economic model that links the behavior of traders
in a ¯nancial market following the arrival of news, to serial correlation in the squared price
changes that arise from the market.
Empirical analysis of ¯nancial data reveals several additional features of the data that
an economic model should explain. First, there is extensive serial correlation in the number
of trades (Harris, 1987) and in total shares traded (Harris, 1987; Andersen, 1996; Brock
and LeBaron, 1996). Second, serial correlation in trades is more persistent than serial
correlation in squared price changes (Harris, 1987; Andersen, 1996; Steigerwald, 1997).2
Gallant, Hsieh, and Tauchen (1991) show that if the number of trades in a calendar period
is serially correlated, then squared price changes are serially correlated. Although the ¯nding
of Gallant, Hsieh, and Tauchen provides an important link between trades and squared price
changes, an economic model that links the arrival of news to the empirical features of the
data through the actions of traders is needed to accurately specify a statistical model.
We develop an economic model of trade in a ¯nancial market that links the arrival of
news to serial correlation in trades, and hence, serial correlation in squared price changes.
The exogenous arrival of private information (news) is captured by signals that informed
agents receive. Agents trade anonymously with a market specialist who does not receive
a signal. The market specialist faces an adverse selection problem because the specialist
trades with more informed agents with positive probability.
The arrival of private signals has two important e®ects. First, informed traders enter
the market, increasing the number of trades relative to trading periods in which there is
no news (such trading periods are commonly referred to as \trading days"). Over trading
periods shorter than a trading day, if informed traders have an informational advantage,
1For a survey, see Bollerslev, Engle, and Nelson (1993).
2Similarly, Tauchen, Zhang, and Liu (1996) report that a price change has more persistent e®ects on
volume than on squared price changes.
2then most likely informed traders will have an informational advantage the next period as
well since information is revealed slowly over time, due to the presence of liquidity traders.
Thus the entry and exit of informed traders implies trades are serially correlated. Second,
the market specialist widens the bid-ask spread in response to the possible adverse selection
problem. As trade occurs, the market specialist uses Bayes rule to update beliefs and hence
the bid and ask. As informed traders trade and reveal their information, the bid-ask spread
declines. Because the squared (calendar period) price change is determined by the number
of trades in the period and the variance of the price innovation for each trade, positive serial
correlation in trades leads to positive serial correlation in squared price changes. Because
the bid-ask spread bounds the variance of trade-by-trade price innovations, the declining
bid-ask spread reduces the serial correlation in squared price changes without a®ecting the
serial correlation in trades. Thus, serial correlation in trades is more persistent than is serial
correlation in squared price changes.
The entry and exit of informed traders after the arrival of private information is a key
component of our model. The importance of private information as a determinant of stock
price volatility is supported by French and Roll (1986), who conclude that revelation of
private information (rather than public information or pricing errors) drives stock price
changes. Our model is based on the market microstructure model of Easley and O'Hara
(1992) which models the news arrival process. Market microstructure models which do not
model the news arrival process generally do not exhibit serial correlation in trades. Glosten
and Milgrom (1985) consider only a single news event, so trades are constant and thus
serially uncorrelated. Sargent (1993) and Brock and LeBaron (1996) model traders who
receive noisy signals. Because traders do not decide to leave the market, trades are serially
uncorrelated, although volume generally declines through time.
Several researchers propose alternative explanations for serial correlation in squared price
changes. Timmerman (1996) combines rare structural breaks in the dividend process with
incomplete learning. Shorish and Spear (1996) show how moral hazard between the owner
and manager of a ¯rm generates serial correlation in squared price changes in a Lucas
asset pricing model. Den Haan and Spear (1997) show how agency costs and borrowing
constraints give rise to wealth e®ects that yield serial correlation in squared interest rate
changes. Dividend based models provide an important ¯rst step by directly explaining serial
correlation in squared price changes at low frequencies. Serial correlation in such models
does not arise from the trading process, since the \no trade" theorems hold. In contrast our
model explains how news (say about the dividend process) generates high frequency serial
correlation through the trading process.
32 Market Microstructure Model
We consider a pure dealership market. In this way we rule out brokerage services provided by
the specialist, implying that all orders are market orders.3 The specialist sets a bid and ask,
which are the prices at which he is willing to buy and sell, respectively, one share of stock.
The bid and ask are determined so that the specialist earns zero expected pro¯ts from each
trade. The zero expected pro¯t condition is an equilibrium condition, which arises from the
potential free entry of additional market specialists should the bid and ask lead to positive
expected pro¯ts for the specialist. Thus, as in Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and Easley and
O'Hara (1992), we assume a Bertrand-style market.
The information structure of the market is as follows. Informed traders learn the true
share value with positive probability before trading starts, while the specialist and unin-
formed traders do not learn the true share value before trading starts. We de¯ne the interval
over which asymmetric information is present to be a trading day, although we recognize
that the interval need not correspond to one calendar day. At the beginning of each trading
day informed traders receive the signal Sm, where m indexes trading days. At the end of
each trading day the signal is revealed to uninformed traders and to the specialist, and all
traders agree upon the share value.
On each trading day the random dollar value per share, Vm, takes one of two values
vLm < vHm with P(Vm = vLm) = ±. To ensure the continuity of prices over trading days,
EVm = vm¡1 if the informed learn the true value of the stock on trading day m ¡ 1. If the
informed do not learn the true value of the stock on trading day m ¡ 1, then we presume
the possible share values are unchanged and vLm = vLm¡1 and vHm = vHm¡1.
The signals received by informed traders at the start of a trading day are independent
across trading days and identically distributed. The signal Sm takes the value: sH if the
informed receive the high signal and learn Vm = vHm, sL if the informed receive the low
signal and learn Vm = vLm, and s0 if the informed receive the uninformative signal and
hence, no private information. The probability that the informed learn the true value of the
stock through the signal is µ, so the probability that Sm takes the value sL is ±µ.
The signal completely determines the trading decisions of the informed. Conditional
on receiving the uninformative signal, informed agents do not trade because of identical
preferences. If informed traders receive signal sL, then informed traders always sell as long
as the specialist is uncertain that the true value is vLm. If informed traders receive signal
sH, then informed traders always buy as long as the specialist is uncertain that the true
3Our market specialist does not keep an order book. Bollerslev and Domowitz (1991) relate the variance
of prices directly to the spread existing in the order book. As such, they are able to obtain heteroskedasticity
without serial correlation in the number of trades.
4value is vHm.
All traders and the market specialist, are risk neutral and rational. To induce uninformed
rational traders to trade, some disparity of preferences or endowments across traders must
exist. We let !i be the rate of time discount for the ith trader. As in Glosten and Milgrom
each individual assigns random utility to shares of stock, s, and current consumption, c, as
!sVm + c.4 The larger the value of ! the greater is the desire to invest and forego current
consumption. We set ! = 1 for the specialist and informed traders. There are three types
of uninformed traders, those with ! = 1, who have identical preferences and do not trade,
those with ! = 0, who always sell the stock, and those with ! = 1, who always buy the
stock. Among the population of uninformed traders, the proportion with ! = 1 is 1 ¡ ",
the proportion with ! = 1 is (1 ¡ °)", and the proportion with ! = 0 is °". The trading
decisions of the uninformed are determined completely by the value of ! and do not depend
on the bid and ask.
Traders arrive to the market one at a time, so we index traders by their order of arrival.
The probability that the arriving trader is informed is ® > 0. A trader arrives, observes the
bid and ask, and decides whether to buy, sell, or not trade. Let Ci be the random variable
that corresponds to the trade decision of trader i. Then Ci takes one of three values: cA if
the ith trader buys one share at the ask, Ai; cB if the ith trader sells one share at the bid,
Bi; and cN if the ith trader elects not to trade. The sequence of trading decisions is public
information. Let Zi be the publicly available information set after i traders have come to
the market. The information set available to the specialist and the uninformed is Zi.
Because the specialist and the uninformed have the same information set, they have
the same learning process. In what follows, we simply refer to the learning process for the
specialist, noting that the same process applies to the uninformed. After the action of the
trader, the specialist revises beliefs about the signal received by informed traders, and thence
about the true value of a share. After the ith trader has come to the market, the specialist's
belief that informed traders received a high signal is,
P (Sm = sHjZi) = yi:
Correspondingly, the specialist's belief that informed traders received a low signal is,
P (Sm = sLjZi) = xi:
4We assume an in¯nite number of traders so that the probability of any player playing more than once is
zero. Because Vm is realized at the end of the trading day, Vm is the random share value used to construct
a trader's utility at the end of a trading day.
5By construction, the specialist's belief that informed traders received an uninformative signal
is,
P(Sm = s0jZi) = 1 ¡ xi ¡ yi:
The specialist's beliefs about Sm translate directly into beliefs about the value of a share.
If the specialist believes Sm = sH, then the accuracy of the signal implies that the specialist
believes Vm = vHm. Similarly, if the specialist believes Sm = sL, then the specialist also
believes Vm = vLm. If the specialist believes Sm = s0, then the specialist assigns the
unconditional probabilities to the possible values for Vm. To summarize, after the ith trader
has come to the market, the specialist's conditional probability that Vm = vHm is
P(Vm = vHmjZi) = yi + (1 ¡ xi ¡ yi)(1 ¡ ±);
while P(Vm = vLmjZi) = 1 ¡ P(Vm = vHmjZi). The action of each trader, even the decision
not to trade, conveys information about the signal received by informed traders.
2.1 Determination of Ask and Bid
At the beginning of each trading day, x0 = µ± and y0 = µ(1 ¡ ±). Let A1 and B1 be
the initial ask and bid, respectively. (Thus A1 is the ask that the ¯rst trader faces.) The
equilibrium condition that the specialist earn zero expected pro¯t from each trade provides
the equations that determine the quoted prices (B1;A1). In essence, the quoted prices set
the specialist's expected loss from trade with an informed trader equal to the specialist's
expected gain from trade with an uninformed trader. We explicilty derive A1 (derivation of
B1 follows similar logic). If the ¯rst trader trades at the ask, then the specialist's expected
loss from trade with an informed trader is
® ¢ y0 (A1 ¡ vHm);
where y0 (A1 ¡ vHm) is the expected loss if the ¯rst trader trades at the ask, given that the
¯rst trader is informed. Similarly, if the ¯rst trader trades at the ask, then the specialist's
expected gain from trade with an uninformed trader is
(1 ¡ ®)"(1 ¡ °)f[x0 + ±(1 ¡ x0 ¡ y0)](A1 ¡ vLm) + [y0 + (1 ¡ ±)(1 ¡ x0 ¡ y0)](Ai ¡ vHm)g:
If expected pro¯ts equal zero, then
A1 =
®y0vHm + (1 ¡ ®)"(1 ¡ °)E (VmjZ0)
®y0 + (1 ¡ ®)"(1 ¡ °)
;
6where E (VmjZ0) = x0vLm + y0vHm + (1 ¡ x0 ¡ y0)EVm. In parallel fashion
B1 =
®x0vLm + (1 ¡ ®)"°E (VmjZ0)
®x0 + (1 ¡ ®)"°
:
The equations for (Bi;Ai) are simply the equations for (B1;A1) with y0 replaced by yi¡1 and
x0 replaced by xi¡1 (which implies E (VmjZ0) is replaced by E (VmjZi¡1)). As one would
expect, both the bid and ask increase with yi¡1 and decrease with xi¡1.
It is easy to see that vLm · Bi · Ai · vHm, with strict inequality unless the specialist
is certain the informed learned the true value of Vm (no adverse selection). Mathematically,
the specialist is certain the informed learned the true value of Vm if xi¡1 = 1 or yi¡1 = 1.
It is also easy to see that Bi · E (VmjZi¡1) · Ai, which follows directly from vLm ·
E (VmjZi¡1) · vHm.
2.2 Learning Rules
As trading occurs, information accrues to the specialist. In response, the specialist updates
the probabilities (xi;yi). We begin by examining how the specialist learns from the action
of the ¯rst trader and explicitly discuss only updating of y1 (updating of x1 follows similar
logic).5 The key parameters that govern the speed of learning are ® and ". If the ¯rst trader
trades at the ask
y1 = y0
® + (1 ¡ ®)"(1 ¡ °)
®y0 + (1 ¡ ®)"(1 ¡ °)
:
As long as y0 < 1, a trade at the ask increases y1. If ® = 1 or " = 0 only informed traders
trade, so learning is immediate and y1 = 1. If the ¯rst trader trades at the bid
y1 = y0
(1 ¡ ®)"°
®x0 + (1 ¡ ®)"°
:
As long as x0 > 0, a trade at the bid decreases y1. If ® = 1 or " = 0 again learning is
immediate, so y1 = 0 and x1 = 1. Finally, if the ¯rst trader does not trade
y1 = y0
(1 ¡ ®)(1 ¡ ")
®(1 ¡ x0 ¡ y0) + (1 ¡ ®)(1 ¡ ")
:
As long as (1 ¡ x0 ¡ y0) > 0, a decision not to trade decreases y1. If ® = 1, or if " = 1 in
which case all uninformed traders trade, then learning is immediate with y1 = 0 and x1 = 0.
5The updating, or learning formulae are derived from Bayes rule in the Appendix.
7The learning formulae for yi are simply the learning formulae for y1 with y0 replaced by
yi¡1. The learning formulae for xi are:
xi = xi¡1
(1 ¡ ®)"(1 ¡ °)
®yi¡1 + (1 ¡ ®)"(1 ¡ °)
;
if trader i trades at the ask;
xi = xi¡1
® + (1 ¡ ®)"°
®xi¡1 + (1 ¡ ®)"°
;
if trader i trades at the bid; and
xi = xi¡1
(1 ¡ ®)(1 ¡ ")
®(1 ¡ xi¡1 ¡ yi¡1) + (1 ¡ ®)(1 ¡ ")
;
if trader i does not trade.
2.3 Consistency of Learning
We have posited that the signal is revealed at the end of a trading day, which consists
of a ¯nite number of trader arrivals. To ensure that the learning formulae we described
above are useful, we establish that if there were an in¯nite number of trader arrivals, the
specialist would learn the value of Sm. As a result, the bid and ask converge to the strong-
form e±cient value of a share, in which the bid and ask re°ect both the public and private
information. Because transaction prices are determined by the bid and ask, transaction
prices also converge to the strong-form e±cient value of a share.
Three sets of beliefs capture the specialist's uncertainty about the value of Sm. The ¯rst
is the specialist's belief that Sm = sH, which is expressed as the sequence of conditional
probabilities fyig
1
i=1. The second is the specialist's belief that Sm = sL, which is expressed
as the sequence of conditional probabilities fxig
1
i=1 , and ¯nally the third is the belief that
Sm = s0, which is expressed as the sequence f1 ¡ xi ¡ yig
1
i=1 .
Theorem 1: The sequence of bids and asks, and hence the sequence of transaction prices,
converge almost surely to their strong-form e±cient values at an exponential rate. Formally,
as i ! 1:
If Sm = sH, then xi
as ! 0, yi
as ! 1 and Ai
as ! vHm, Bi
as ! vHm.
If Sm = sL, then xi
as ! 1, yi
as ! 0 and Ai
as ! vLm, Bi
as ! vLm.
If Sm = s0, then xi
as ! 0, yi
as ! 0 and Ai
as ! EVm, Bi
as ! EVm.
8Proof: See Appendix.
Although the asymptotic behavior of prices is straightforward to determine, calculating
the serial correlation properties requires knowledge of the distribution of share prices in each
time period, a more di±cult task which we turn to next.
3 Calendar Period Implications
With the learning rules established, we now show that the model accounts for the main
empirical ¯ndings described in the introduction. We ¯rst show that one implication of the
model is that the number of trades in a calendar period is serially correlated. As described in
the introduction, such serial correlation leads to serial correlation in squared price changes.
We then show that the serial correlation in the number of trades per calendar period is more
persistent than is the serial correlation in squared price changes.
To derive calendar period implications, we must be clear about how trading opportunities
are aggregated. A trading day contains k calendar periods (such as an hour). A calendar
period, which is indexed by t, contains ´ trader arrivals, which as above are indexed by i.
(We can think of a trader arrival, or trading opportunity, as a unit of economic time.) The
sample period consists of a large sample of trading days.
Calendar Period Trades
First we examine the covariance structure of the number of trades per calendar period.
Let the number of trades in (calendar) period t be It: Because ´ traders arrive each period, It
takes integer values between 0 and ´. In fact It is distributed as a binomial random variable
where the number of trades corresponds to the number of \successes" in ´ \trials". For all
periods on trading day m the probability that a trader decides to trade is
P (Ci 6= cNjSm 6= s0) = ® + (1 ¡ ®)";
P (Ci 6= cNjSm = s0) = (1 ¡ ®) ";
so the distribution of It conditional on the value of Sm is
Itj(Sm 6= s0) » B (´;® + "(1 ¡ ®));
Itj(Sm = s0) » B (´;"(1 ¡ ®)):
Thus, for all calendar periods on trading day m
9E [ItjSm 6= s0] = ¹1 = ´(® + "(1 ¡ ®));
E [ItjSm = s0] = ¹0 = ´"(1 ¡ ®);
V ar[ItjSm 6= s0] = ¾
2
1 = ´[® + "(1 ¡ ®)](1 ¡ ®)(1 ¡ ");
V ar[ItjSm = s0] = ¾
2
0 = ´"(1 ¡ ®)[1 ¡ "(1 ¡ ®)]:
Unconditionally, we have:
E [It] = ¹ = µ¹1 + (1 ¡ µ)¹0 (1)
V ar[It] = ¾
2 = µ¾
2
1 + (1 ¡ µ)¾
2
0 + µ(1 ¡ µ)(¹1 ¡ ¹0)
2 (2)
Given the above structure for the number of trades in a calendar period, we can derive
the serial correlation properties of the number of trades.
Theorem 2: Let r > 0. If r < k, then It¡r and It are positively serially correlated. If
r ¸ k, then It¡r and It are uncorrelated. Further for all r, the correlation between It¡r and










Theorem 2 gives the exact formula for the correlation. Therefore, it is straightforward
to establish comparative statics, which we summarize in the following corollary.
Corollary 3: If r < k, then the correlation between It¡r and It is decreasing in r,
increasing in k, increasing in ´ and increasing in ®.
Proof:





¶ ´µ(1 ¡ µ)®2
"(1 ¡ ®)[1 ¡ "(1 ¡ ®)] + µ®[(1 ¡ ®)(1 ¡ 2") + ®´(1 ¡ µ)]
:
10The results then follow by taking the appropriate derivatives.
The comparative static calculations in Corollary 3 imply certain patterns of serial corre-
lation in trades across markets. We ¯rst study how the serial correlation in trades is a®ected
by changes in the parameters characterizing aggregation over time. As the number of peri-
ods in a trading day, k, increases, the impact of the entry and exit of informed traders grows
and the serial correlation increases. As the number of trader arrivals in a calendar period,
´, increases, the impact of informed traders is again reinforced and the serial correlation
increases.Thus one may expect to see more pronounced serial correlation in asset markets
in which the revelation of private information takes a relatively longer period of time. Sim-
ilarly, one may expect to see more pronounced serial correlation in thicker markets than in
thinner markets.
Both of the preceding calculations allow only one parameter to change; implicit in our
comparison of market thickness is the assumption that the length of the trading day is ¯xed.
Yet for many comparsions, both k and ´ are changing. A leading case would be comparsion
of information gathered at two di®erent calendar period frequencies, say 5 minute intervals
versus hourly intervals. Because the data are gathered for the same asset, the number of
trader arrivals in a trading day, ¿ = k´, is constant for both frequencies. To understand
the e®ect on the correlation caused by changing from 5 minute intervals to hourly intervals,
we substitute
¿
k for ´ and take the derivative with respect to k. As the change from 5
minute intervals to hourly intervals simultaneously decreases k and increases ´, we have two
countervailing e®ects on the correlation. In general, the serial correlation can either increase
or decrease with a change in calendar period and, perhaps most interestingly, the change is
not constant across r. Because the magnitude of the e®ect of a change in k on the correlation
depends on r, it is for long lags that we would most likely see the serial correlation in trades
decline as we move from 5 minute data to hourly data.
To understand how the serial correlation in trades depends upon the underlying para-
meters of the market microstructure model, we can decompose the correlation into three
terms. The ¯rst term is the di®erence between the number of trades on a trading day with
news and on a trading day without news, which is (¹1 ¡ ¹0)
2. The remaining two terms
are the conditional variances on a trading day with news (¾2
1) and a trading day without
news (¾2
0), respectively. An increase in (¹1 ¡ ¹0)
2 increases both the covariance of trades and
the variance of trades, where (¹1 ¡ ¹0)
2 enters the variance through the component for the
variance of the conditional means, so the overall impact on the serial correlation in trades
must be calculated. An increase to the conditional variances leads only to an increase in the
variance, so the overall impact is to reduce the serial correlation in trades.
To understand why the serial correlation is an increasing function of ®, observe that
11increasing ® has two e®ects on the correlation. First, with a larger number of informed
traders, there is a wider di®erence between the number of trades on a trading day with news
and on a trading day without news. Second, because the informed traders all make the
same trading decision, an increase in the number of informed traders decreases at least one
of the conditional variances. As a result, the positive impact on the covariance outweighs
the postive impact on the variance. Because the serial correlation in trades is an increasing
function of ®, a market with many informed traders has more serial correlation in trades
than does a market with fewer informed traders.
Next, consider the relationship between " (the fraction of uninformed who do not trade)
and the serial correlation in trades. For speci¯c parameter values the partial derivative
is de¯nitively signed. If " is small (precisely, if " < 1¡2®"
2(1¡®)), then virtually all trades are
by informed traders and increasing " dilutes the informed traders and reduces the serial
correlation in trades. If ® is large (precisely if ®µ ¸
1
2), then increasing " increases the
variation in trades across days and increases the serial correlation in trades.
In similar fashion, increasing µ increases the correlation if µ is small enough (precisely
(1 ¡ µ2) > ¾2
1). Becausegood and bad news aresymmetric inthemodel, the serialcorrelation
is una®ected by changes to ° or ±. An interesting implication is that our model predicts
correlation in a variety of markets. For example, there is serial correlation in trades in both
liquid and illiquid markets. Our ¯ndings of serial correlation even in illiquid markets is also
supported empirically by Lange (1998).
Of course, serial correlation in the number of trades could be arti¯cially imposed by
creating serial correlation in the private information arrival process. Engle et al. (1990)
¯nd some evidence of serial correlation in public news; although serial correlation in public
news does not imply serial correlation in private news. Appealing to serial correlation in
private news does not really provide an economic cause for serial correlation in squared price
changes as it begs the question as to what causes serial correlation in private news.
Behavior of Individual Trader Price Changes
To understand the serial correlation in squared price changes per calendar period, we
¯rst study the behavior of the price changes that follow the arrival of each trader. The
price change that results from the action of trader i is Ui = E (VmjZi)¡E (VmjZi¡1), where
E (VmjZi) = xivLm +yivHm +(1¡xi¡yi)EVm.6 The de¯nition of Ui incorporates the arrival
6The price is conditional on public information and is hence theoretically observable to the econome-
trician. In reality the set of parameters must be estimated, resulting in an estimate of the price based on
the estimated parameters. However, in most empirical studies of serial correlation in squared price changes,
econometricians use the bid, ask, or last trade, which may have di®erent properties from the price.
12of public information after the decision of trader i¡1 but before the decision of trader i. To
relate decisions in economic time given by our model to the calendar period measurements,





Price changes in economic time thus drive calendar price changes. In turn, the information
content of trades (or no trades) drive price changes in economic time. The information
content of a trade or no trade depends on the history of trades and the parameter values.
For example, if " is large, no trades convey relatively more information. If ° is large, a
trade at the ask conveys relatively more information. Trades or no trades at early economic
time periods convey more information than trades at later time intervals. In this way, serial
correlation in squared price changes are serially correlated.
To provide insight, we study in detail the price change associated with the arrival of the
¯rst trader on trading day m. There are three possible values for U1, one corresponding to
each of the possible trade decisions. If C1 = cA, then E (VmjZ1) = A1, and
U1 =
®y0 [vHm ¡ E (VmjZ0)]
P (C1 = cAjZ0)
:
If C1 = cB, then E (VmjZ1) = B1 and
U1 =
®x0 [vLm ¡ E (VmjZ0)]
P (C1 = cBjZ0)
:
Finally, if C1 = cN, then
E (VmjZ1) =
®(1 ¡ x0 ¡ y0)EVm + (1 ¡ ®)(1 ¡ ")E (VmjZ0)
®(1 ¡ x0 ¡ y0) + (1 ¡ ®)(1 ¡ ")
and
U1 =
®(1 ¡ x0 ¡ y0)[EVm ¡ E (VmjZ0)]
P (C1 = cNjZ0)
:
If initial priors are logically consistent, so that ±y0 = (1 ¡ ±)x0, then updating from the
¯rst trader is more informative if the a trade occurs then if a trader does not occur and
13B1 < E (VmjZ0;C1 = cN) < A1. While the inequality is generally satis¯ed for the remaining
traders, it is possible for E (VmjZi¡1;Ci = cN) to fall outside (Bi;Ai).7




P (C1 = cjjZ0)U1(C1 = cj);
which equals
®y0vHm + ®x0vLm + ®(1 ¡ x0 ¡ y0)EVm ¡ ®E (VmjZ0) = 0:
Because
P (Ci = cAjsm) 6= P (Ci = cAjZi)
for any ¯nite i, price changes are not mean zero with respect to the information set of the
informed.















2 [vHm ¡ E (VmjZ0)]
2
P (C1 = cAjZ0)
+
(®x0)
2 [vLm ¡ E (VmjZ0)]
2
P (C1 = cBjZ0)
+
®2 (1 ¡ x0 ¡ y0)
2 [EVm ¡ E (VmjZ0)]
2
P (C1 = cNjZ0)
:
To understand the impact of informed traders on the behavior of calendar period squared
price changes, we must compare the variance of U1 for Sm = s0 with the variance of U1 for
Sm 6= s0. (In general, the comparison will depend on whether the low or high signal was
received. If ° = ± = :5, then x0 = y0 and the variance of U1 is identical for the low and high
signals. In the remainder of the section we assume ° = ± = :5 and so we do not need to
distinguish between the low and high signals.) The addition of the signal alters the variance










P (C1 = cjjSm = sm)U
2
1(C1 = cj):
We compare the probabilities of each trade outcome for Sm = sH with Sm = s0:
7For example, if " is very large and ® is very small (so that the rare no trade decisions are most often
made by informed traders), then it is possible that E (VmjZi¡1;Ci = cN) > Ai.
14P (C1 = cAjSm = sH) = P (C1 = cAjSm = s0) + ®
P (C1 = cNjSm = sH) = P (C1 = cNjSm = s0) ¡ ®;
wheretheprobability that C1 = cB is the same for thetwo values of Sm. Thus E (U2
1jSm = sH;Z0)¡
E (U2




2 [vHm ¡ E (VmjZ0)]
2
[P (C1 = cAjZ0)]
2 ¡
®2 (1 ¡ x0 ¡ y0)
2 [EVm ¡ E (VmjZ0)]
2




which is greater than zero because EVm = E (VmjZ0). Because the term is positive, the
price uncertainty from the ¯rst trader is higher on a day with news than on a day without
news. The impact of trader 2 and following traders is not immediately signed because
EVm 6= E (VmjZi) for i > 0. To determine the sign of the di®erence we study the behavior
of Ui for general i.
For general i there are 3i possible values for Ui, so direct calculation of the moments
of Ui is tedious. Rather, we construct analytic bounds to the moments that describe the
behavior of the distribution of Ui. Let
e Ai ¡ e Bi = maxfAi;E[VmjZi¡1;Ci = cN]g ¡ minfBi;E[VmjZi¡1;Ci = cN]g
be the \spread" or the di®erence between the maximum price change and the minimum
price change. For most parameter values, the spread is equal to the familiar bid-ask spread.
However, as noted earlier, for some parameter values a no trade may induce larger or smaller
price changes than a trade at the ask or bid, respectively.
Let fUig
k´
i=1 be the sequence of trader price changes (price changes in economic time)
for a trading day. With respect to the public information set, the elements of the sequence
are uncorrelated but are dependent and not identically distributed. Speci¯cally, the trader
price changes are heteroskedastic and the heteroskedasticity is autoregressive.
Theorem 4: Price changes in economic time satisfy:
1. E (UijZi¡1) = 0
2. E (UhUijZi¡1) = 0 for h < i
3. [P(Ci = cA)P(Ci = cB)P(Ci = cN)]
³









The ¯rst two parts of Theorem 4 deliver the traditional results that EUi = 0 and that
E (UiUj) = 0 if i does not equal j. The spread drives the variance in Ui. Theorem 4 and
Proposition 1 together imply that E (U2
i jZi¡1) ! 0 as i ! 1. As the market maker becomes
certain of the true value of the share, the bid and ask converge to the true value of the share
and squared price changes go to zero.
To determine how the properties of the distribution of Ui are a®ected by the signal
received by informed traders, we compare the variance of Ui if Sm = s0 with the variance of
Ui if Sm 6= s0. Parallel to the case for trader 1, E (U2
i jSm = sH;Zi¡1)¡E (U2





2 [vHm ¡ E (VmjZi¡1)]
2
[P (C1 = cAjZi¡1)]
2 ¡
®2 (1 ¡ xi¡1 ¡ yi¡1)
2 [EVm ¡ E (VmjZi¡1)]
2




The di®erence (4) depends on E (VmjZi¡1), which in turn depends on (xi¡1;yi¡1).
If the proportion of informed traders is high enough, then learning takes place quickly
and the entire distribution of Ui can be directly calculated. For example, if ® = :9, then the
bid-ask spread is reduced very close to zero in only 10 trades. For ® = :9 and ° = ± = :5,
the columns of Table 1 contain the values of (4) corresponding to trader 1 through trader 8
and the rows of Table 1 correspond to di®erent values of ".
Table 1
Value of E (U2
i jSm = sH;Zi¡1) ¡ E (U2
i jSm = s0;Zi¡1)
® = :9
Trader: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
" = :9 3.46 0.64 0.55 0.14 0.08 0.03 0.01 0.00
" = :8 2.89 0.52 0.46 0.11 0.07 0.02 0.01 0.00
" = :7 2.30 0.47 0.32 0.09 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.00
" = :6 1.66 0.42 0.18 0.07 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00
" = :5 0.97 0.33 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
" = :4 0.20 0.18 -.05 -.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
" = :3 -.65 -.11 -.09 -.09 -.01 -.01 0.00 0.00
" = :2 -1.61 -.70 -.14 -.05 -.04 -.01 -.01 0.00
" = :1 -2.73 -2.12 -.32 -.15 -.09 -.02 -.01 0.00
The entries in Table 1 reveal two important features. First, as learning accumulates
(moving across a row) the di®erence in squared price changes tends toward zero. Second,
16the value of " plays a key role. For large values of ", the behavior of transaction level price
changes is such that the variance is higher, uniformly, for days in which the informed trade.
As " declines, the variance of transaction level price changes can be higher on days in which
the informed do not trade. Why? With " low, very few of the uninformed trade and so
there are very few trades if Sm = s0 (because the informed also do not trade). With so few
trades, learning is slowed enough that the slow learning corresponding to Sm = s0 actually
outweighs the uncertainty associated with Sm 6= s0.
For smaller values of ® learning occurs more slowly, so reduction of the bid-ask spread
to zero takes many more trades and calculation of the exact distribution is cumbersome.
To understand the behavior of (4) with a smaller value of ®, we approximate the exact
distribution with simulations. In the last ¯gure titled \mean: squared price changes" we
report the simulated distribution for ® = :2 and " = :5 and construct 3000 simulations. To be
precise, we simulate 3000 trading days. At the outset of each trading day the probability that
the informed receive a signal (µ) is .4, so slightly less than half of the simulations correspond
to the line labeled \News Days".8 A trading day is assumed to consist of 960 trader arrivals,
but as the ¯gure reveals the squared price change is e®ectively zero after the ¯rst 500 trader
arrivals. The last attached ¯gure contains E (U2
i jSm = sH;Zi¡1) ¡ E (U2
i jSm = s0;Zi¡1) as
the di®erence between the lines corresponding to \News Days" and \No News Days". As
the ¯gure reveals, the di®erence is generally positive and shrinks to zero as the number of
traders increases. (The horizontal axis measures the number of traders that have arrived,
so learning is nearly complete after 500 traders have come to the market.)
Calendar Period Squared Price Changes
From the results above, we form a structure for the expectation of the calendar period
squared price change. The analytic and simulation results indicate that (for reasonably
large values of ") on trading days in which the informed do not trade, the specialist's initial
uncertainty about the signal is resolved fairly quickly. As a result, the variance in calendar
period price changes, which is driven by the random decisions of the uninformed, is constant
over the course of the trading day. In contrast, on trading days in which the informed do
trade, the specialist's uncertainty is not resolved quickly, but rather declines over the course
of the trading day. To capture these phenomena mathematically, let j index the calendar
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where we assume ¾1 > ¾2 > ¢¢¢ > ¾k > ¾0. If calendar period t is the ¯rst period of trading
day m on which Sm 6= s0, the expected squared price change is ¾1. The inequality ¾k > ¾0
arises from the observation that the information advantage of the informed persists until the






= µ¹ ¾k + (1 ¡ µ)¾0;





To derive the serial correlation properties of the squared price change in a calendar
period, an important condition arises that ensure the correlation is positive.


















(¹ ¾k ¡ ¾j)(¹ ¾k ¡ ¾j+r)g;
where the addition is wrapped at k. That is, if j + r > k, then replace j +r with j + r ¡k.
As for the covariance of calendar period trades, the covariance of calendar period squared
price changes is zero if r ¸ k. To determine the sign of the covariance if r < k, we must
examine each term in detail. The ¯rst term in brackets is the sum of the conditional
covariances, which is positive. The second term in brackets is the sum of the covariances
of the conditional means, which is generally negative. Determination of the sign of the
covariance depends on the relative magnitudes of the two terms.
We begin our analytic derivations with a trading day in which there are two periods, so
k = 2. For this case an important condition emerges that is needed to ensure the covariance
is positive.
Condition 1 is said to hold for period j¤, with 1 < j¤ · k, if j¤ is the largest value of j
for which
¾j > µ¹ ¾k + (1 ¡ µ)¾0:
Condition 1 is perhaps most intuitive for the case k = 2. (If a trading day corresponded
to a calendar day, then empirical study of mornings versus afternoons would yield k = 2.)
Recall that positive covariance between two random variables, with the same unconditional
18mean, implies that if one random variable is below the unconditional mean, then the other
random variable tends to be below the unconditional mean. Correspondingly, if one random
variable is above the unconditional mean, then the other random variable tends to be above
the unconditional mean. From the structure for the expectation of calendar period squared
price changes it follows that ¾1 lies above the unconditional mean and ¾0 lies below the
unconditional mean. Let (¢Pt¡1)
2 be the ¯rst period of trading day m. If Sm = s0, then
in expectation (¢Pt¡1)
2 equals ¾0 and so tends to be below the unconditional mean. Yet
if Sm = s0, then in expectation (¢Pt)
2 also equals ¾0 and so also tends to be below the
unconditional mean. If Sm 6= s0, then in expectation (¢Pt¡1)
2 equals ¾1 and so tends to be
above the unconditional mean. With Sm 6= s0, then in expectation (¢Pt)
2 equals ¾2 and the
behavior of the covariance depends on the relative magnitude of ¾2 and the conditional mean.
If Condition 1 holds, then ¾2 is larger than the unconditional mean, so if (¢Pt¡1)
2 tends
to be above the unconditional mean, then (¢Pt)
2 also tends to be above the unconditional
mean.












(¹ ¾k ¡ ¾j)(¹ ¾k ¡ ¾j+r)g;
where the addition is wrapped at k. That is, if j +r > k, then replace j +r with j +r ¡ k.

















To shed further light on the behavior of the covariance of calendar period squared price
changes, we derive analytic results for a trading day with 3 periods. If k = 3, then the





, which corresponds to the covariance
of the conditional means, is identical for r = 1 and r = 2. As the conditional covariance for


















19Proposition 6: Let Condition 1 hold for period 3 with k = 3. For r < k the covariance
of calendar period squared price changes is positive.
Proof: See Appendix.
While Condition 1 holds naturally for period 2, there is no such natural intuition for
extending Condition 1 to hold for period 3. If there are 3 periods in a trading day, then
in the last period of a trading day enough of the information of the traders may have
been revealed that the expected squared price change for that period need not exceed the
unconditional expected squared price change for a period. If Condition 1 holds only for
period 2, then the decline of the covariance in calendar period squared price changes can be
dramatically rapid.
More Rapid Decay of Covariance for Calendar Period Squared Price Changes
As we shall see, the heteroskedasticity in U2
i that arises from the movements in the
expected bid-ask spread play an important role in explaining the persistence puzzle. If U2
i is
assumed to be homoskedastic, as in Gallant, Hsieh, and Tauchen (1991), then the covariance
of calendar period squared price changes is driven exclusively by the covariance in calendar
period trades, and the persistence in the covariance in trades should be matched by the
persistence in the covariance in squared price changes. Our model breaks the persistence
link because one prediction of our model is that the variance of Ui is not constant. In fact,
the variance of Ui declines as trades occur because information is revealed and the bid-ask
spread declines over time. If the variance of Ui declines, then the covariance in squared price
changes will eventually be less than the covariance in the number of trades. We show that
even during the period in which all traders are willing to trade, the variance of Ui declines so
that the news arrival has a more persistent e®ect on the number of trades than on squared
price changes.
Close study of the case in which k = 3 reveals much about the relative decay of the
correlation in calendar period trades and squared price changes. One of the empirical features
brought forward in the introduction is that the correlation of calendar period trades decays
more slowly than does the correlation of calendar period squared price changes. Close study
of the case in which k = 3 reveals why this is so. As the variance of either quantity is
constant as the lag of the correlation changes, the decay of the correlation is driven by the
decay of the covariance.







20Proposition 7: Let Condition 1 hold for period 3 with k = 3. The covariance, and
hence the correlation, of calendar period squared price changes decays more rapidly than the
covariance of calendar period trades.
Proof: The proportional decay rates are revealed by direct calculation from the covari-







so the covariance declines by ¯fty percent.












µ(1 ¡ µ)[(¾1 ¡ ¾0)(¾2 ¡ ¾3) + (¾2 ¡ ¾0)(¾3 ¡ ¾0)]
¾
:
Because Condition 1 holds for period 3, the covariance between (¢Pt¡1)
2 and (¢Pt)
2 is
positive. By de¯nition ¾1 > ¾2 > ¾3 > ¾0, so the second term is positive and the covariance
declines by more than ¯fty percent.
If Condition 1 holds for period 2, it is possible that the covariance of calendar period
squared price changes at lag 2 is negative. As the covariance of calendar period trades is
always nonnegative, such a ¯nding further enforces the more rapid decay of the covariance
of calendar period squared price changes.
Corrolary 8: Let Condition 1 hold for period 2 with k = 3. There is an open subset of






Proof: We need only establish that there exist parameter values for which the covariance
is negative. Consider the set f¾jg
3
j=1 = f20;7;3g so ¹ ¾3 = 10: Let ¾0 = 1. From the





is negative if µ > :33. Let µ = :4, so Condition 1 holds for period 2. As Condition 1 continues
to hold for period 2 for an open set of values of µ above .4, Corollary 8 is established.
Note that for the set of parameter values that establish Corollary 8, Condition 1 does
not hold for period 3, as must be the case from Lemma 4.
214 Simulations
To provide an idea of the pattern of serial correlation that is implied by our model, we
simulate sequences of trades and the associated price changes over a period of many trading
days.
Let the unit of economic time be one second and assume that information is revealed at
the end of each day, so that there are ¿ = 2880 trading opportunities in an 8 hour trading
day. Note that the model could also be interpreted as for example, with a unit of economic
time being 2 seconds with news revealed at the end of the second day.9
Suppose ´ = 30, so that calendar time periods are 30 seconds in length. Our simulated
sample consists of 100 trading days, each of which has probability of news µ = :4. Given
news, the probability of good news is ± = :55. To ensure that asymmetries in the model are
not driving our results we set ° = " =
1
2, so that the uninformed are equally likely to buy
or sell. A key parameter that remains is the proportion of traders with private information.
We initially set ® = :2, but vary this parameter, along with ´ in various simulations.
Figure 1 contains the bid and ask from a sample of four trading days. On the ¯rst day,
S = sL, so the informed traded. On the second and third days, S = s0, so the informed did
not trade, while on the fourth day, S = sH, so again the informed traded. The wide spread
at the start of each day re°ects the adverse selection faced by the specialist uncertain of the
participation of informed traders. Squared price changes are thus large at the begining of
the day. As seen in Figure 3, squared price changes decline exponentially with the bid-ask
spread as news is revealed. Further, squared price changes are large on news days versus
no news days. Figure 2 shows the trade process. On days 1 and 4 the informed trade, so
there are more trades (the mean is 1.9). On no news days the informed do not trade and
the mean is correspondingly lower (the mean is 1.1).
Figure 4 depicts the results over 100 trading days. Figure 4 shows the autocorrelation
functions for both trades and squared price changes. The magnitude of the serial correlation
in trades is much larger and more persistent, barely declining even after 10 lags. Serial
correlation in squared price changes is much smaller and declines to nearly zero after 4 lags.
An interesting example is to use the estimation results in [8]. In a similar model, [8]
obtain estimates of ® = :172, "=.33, µ = :75, ¿ = 96, and ± = :502. We also set ´ = 4,
equivalent to 5 minute calendar intervals. Results are detailed in Figure 5. The serial
correlation in trades is small but quite persistent. The serial correlation in squared price
changes is small and barely persists for two lags.
9Easley and O'Hara (1993) in a model similar to ours, assume that a trading opportunity is ¯ve minutes
and a trading day is one day for Ashland Oil, based on the number of trades observed daily (a maximum of
73).
225 Conclusions
In this paper we provide an economic model that generates serial correlation in trades
and serial correlation in squared price changes. Further, serial correlation in trades is more
persistent than serial correlation in squared price changes. We propose that serial correlation
in trades arises simply from the entry and exit of informed traders, who receive a private
signal. Given that informed traders are trading in the current period, informed trader will
most likely trade in the following period, which generates serial correlation in trades. The
serial correlation in trades is quite strong and persistent. In the simulations after 30 lags
the correlation was still above .8.
In our model serial correlation in trades generates serial correlation in squared price
changes. Given that the informed traders are trading, there is more variance in squared
price changes simply because there are more trades in a calendar period. More trades
implies that the price change is the sum of more random trades, which in turn implies that
the price change has a larger variance. Because there is serial correlation in trades, there
is serial correlation in squared price changes. However, there is an additional e®ect on the
serial correlation in squared price changes, the decline in the bid-ask spread. All trades are
at the bid-ask spread, hence expected price changes are bounded by the bid-ask spread. The
bid-ask spread declines as learning proceeds, which reduces the variance and the persistence
of the serial correlation in squared price changes. Given there are more trades in a calendar
period, there are most likely more trades in the next calendar period, which implies higher
variance in both periods. However, the trades in the second calendar period are from a
random variable with a smaller variance, due to the smaller bid-ask spread. Hence the serial
correlation is smaller and less persistent. Our simulations indicate that the correlation
coe±cient at one lag is .35, and declines to .1 after 30 lags. Hence our model replicates the
observed empirical features of the data and explains serial correlation through the entry and
exit of informed traders and the associated revelation of information in the prices.
What information set should be used to form conditional expectations of (¢Pt)2? The
above results indicate that prediction of the variance of price changes depends on prediction
of the entry and exit of informed traders. Speci¯cally, the conditional variance of stock prices
depends on the previous number of trades, but does so in a nonlinear way. The probability
of information arriving, µ, plays an intriguing role. Serial correlation is highest in markets in
which news arrives infrequently, where the arrival of news causes a large number of informed
to enter.
Future research includes expanding our model to the possibility of multiple trading pe-
riods with randomly arriving private news events. Multiple trading periods allows for the
fully informed not to trade (if no news is released) hence the serial correlation in trades will
23likely be even stronger.
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266 Appendix
Derivation of Learning Formulae
We explicilty derive the learning formula for yi given that trader i trades at the ask. All
other learning formulae follow the same logic. From Bayes rule
P (Sm = sHjZi¡1;Ci = cA) =
P(Sm = sHjZi¡1)P(Ci = cAjSm = sH)
P
j=sL;sH;s0
P(Sm = jjZi¡1)P(Ci = cAjSm = j)
:
We must calculate P(Ci = cAjSm = j) for j = sL;sH;s0. If the informed receive the signal
sH, then the informed will trade at the ask. Further, the fraction "(1 ¡ °) of the uninformed
will also trade at the ask. Hence
P (Ci = cAjSm = sH) = ® + (1 ¡ ®)"(1 ¡ °):
If the informed receive the signal sL or do not receive a signal, then the informed will not
trade at the ask. Because only the uninformed trade at the ask if Sm equals sL or s0, both
P(Ci = cAjSm = sL) and P(Ci = cAjSm = s0) equal (1 ¡ ®)"(1 ¡ °).
Proof of Theorem 1
The learning formulae for xi and yi are nonlinear in (xi¡1;yi¡1) and are not recursive,
which make it di±cult to determine the asymptotic behavior of xi and yi. Because the
denominator of the learning formula, conditional on the decision of trader i, is identical for
xi, yi and 1 ¡ xi ¡ yi, the learning formulae for ratios of xi and yi are linear in ratios of
(xi¡1;yi¡1) and recursive. We work with ratios xi and yi and begin with the case Sm = sH,













P(Ci = cAjSm = sL)
P(Ci = cAjSm = sH)
:
If trader i trades at the bid, then the expression for
xi
yi is as above with Ci = cA replaced by




















P(Ci = cAjSm = sL)




P(Ci = cBjSm = sL)
P(Ci = cBjSm = sH)
#
;
27where nA is the number of the ¯rst i trading opportunities for which there was a trade at
the ask, nB is the number of the ¯rst i trading opportunities for which there was a trade
at the bid, and nN is the number of the ¯rst i trading opportunities for which there was no
trade.











P(Ci = jjSm = sH)ln
"
P(Ci = jjSm = sL)
P(Ci = jjSm = sH)
#
(5)
as i ! 1. The right-hand side of (5), multiplied by minus one, is a measure of distance
between the probability measure P(¢jSm = sH) and the probability measure P(¢jSm = sL),
which is termed the entropy of P(¢jSm = sH) relative to P(¢jSm = sL) and is denoted
J(sH;sL). By construction the entropy is nonnegative and equals zero only if the probability








as ! ¡J(sH;sL) < 0
as i ! 1, so that
xi
yi behaves as e¡iJ(sH;sL). Thus
xi
yi converges almost surely to zero at the
exponential rate iJ(sH;sL). A similar argument shows that
1¡xi¡yi
yi converges almost surely
to zero at the exponential rate iJ(sH;sN).
If Sm = sH, then
xi
yi
as ! 0 and
1¡xi¡yi
yi
as ! 0 as i ! 1.









1¡xi¡yi. Again the fact that the trader arrival process is i.i.d. is
su±cient to establish that
if Sm = sL, then
yi
xi




if Sm = s0, then
xi
1¡xi¡yi




as i ! 1.
From the convergence properties of the ratios, we can easily deduce the convergence
properties of xi and yi. We continue with the case Sm = sH and note that similar arguments
hold for Sm = sL and Sm = s0. The statement
1¡xi¡yi
yi
















28which directly implies yi
as ! 1. If yi
as ! 1, then the statement
xi
yi
as ! 0 implies xi
as ! 0. From
the de¯nition of Ai and Bi, if xi
as ! 0 and yi
as ! 1, then Ai
as ! vHm and Bi
as ! vHm.
Proof of Theorem 2
The proof is a straightforward, but tedious calculation of the correlation. By de¯nition,
the covariance is
Cov(It¡r;It) = E (It¡rIt) ¡ EIt¡r ¢ EIt:
If r ¸ k, then the independence of the signal process implies that It¡r is independent of
It, so E (It¡rIt) = EIt¡r ¢ EIt and the covariance is zero.
If r < k, then there are three possible conditional expectations of (It¡rIt). First, if It¡r
and It are measured on the same trading day the conditional expectation of (It¡rIt) is
µ¹
2
1 + (1 ¡ µ)¹
2
0;
which occurs with probability
k¡r
k . Second, if It¡r and It are measured on consecutive
trading days and Sm+1 6= s0, the conditional expectation of (It¡rIt) is
µ¹
2
1 + (1 ¡ µ)¹0¹1;
which occurs with probability
r
kµ. Third, if It¡r and It are measured on consecutive trading
days and Sm+1 = s0, the conditional expectation of (It¡rIt) is
µ¹0¹1 + (1 ¡ µ)¹
2
0;
which occurs with probability
r















[µ¹1 + (1 ¡ µ)¹0]
2 :
Because the process for calendar period trades is stationary, EIt¡r equals EIt. As noted in
the text





















0 r ¸ k
(7)
Combining the covariance and variance of It given by (1) gives the desired correlation.
Because all terms are postive for r < k, the correlation is positive.
Proof of Theorem 4
For the proof of Theorem 4, let CN represent Ci = cN in the conditioning information
set. We have
E (UijZi¡1)
= P(Ci = cA)(Ai ¡ E (VmjZi¡1)) + P(Ci = cB)(Bi ¡ E (VmjZi¡1))
+P(Ci = cN) ¢ (E[VmjZi¡1;CN] ¡ E (VmjZi¡1))
= P(Ci = cA)Ai + P(Ci = cB)Bi + P(Ci = cN)E[VmjZi¡1;CN] ¡ E (VmjZi¡1)
= E (VmjZi¡1) ¡ E (VmjZi¡1) = 0:
In similar fashion we ¯nd that Ui is a serially uncorrelated random variable. Let h and
i be distinct values with h < i,
E (UhUijZi¡1) = EZi¡1 fUh [E (VmjZi¡1) ¡ E (VmjZi¡1)]g = 0:
Recall E (U2
i jZi¡1) equals
P(Ci = cA)(Ai ¡ E (VmjZi¡1))2 + P(Ci = cB)(Bi ¡ E (VmjZi¡1))2
+P(Ci = cN)(E[VmjZi¡1;CN] ¡ E (VmjZi¡1))2:







· P(Ci = cA)( ~ Ai ¡ E (VmjZi¡1))
2 + P(Ci = cB)( ~ Bi ¡ E (VmjZi¡1))
2
+P(Ci = cN)(E[VmjZi¡1;CN]) ¡ E (VmjZi¡1))
2
· [P(Ci = cA) + P(Ci = cN)]( ~ Ai ¡ E (VmjZi¡1))
2
+[P(Ci = cB) + P(Ci = cN)]( ~ Bi ¡ E (VmjZi¡1))
2
· ( ~ Ai ¡ E (VmjZi¡1))








e Ai ¡ e Bi
i2
;
30where the ¯rst inequality follows from the de¯nition of ~ Ai and ~ Bi and the fourth inequality
follows from Bi · E[VmjZi¡1] · Ai. Note that the unconditional variance is immediately









E e Ai ¡ E e Bi
´2
:
To obtain the lower bound for the conditional variance we consider three cases. If







¸ P (Ci = cA)(Ai ¡ E (VmjZi¡1))
2 + P(Ci = cB)(Bi ¡ E (VmjZi¡1))
2
¸ P (Ci = cA)P(Ci = cB)
³
~ Ai ¡ ~ Bi
´2
;








¸ P (Ci = cN)(E[VmjZi¡1;CN] ¡ E (VmjZi¡1))
2 + P(Ci = cB)(Bi ¡ E (VmjZi¡1))
2
¸ P (Ci = cN)P(Ci = cB)
³
~ Ai ¡ ~ Bi
´2
;







¸ P (Ci = cA)(Ai ¡ E (VmjZi¡1))
2 + P (Ci = cN)(E[VmjZi¡1;CN] ¡ E (VmjZi¡1))
2
¸ P (Ci = cA)P(Ci = cN)
³
~ Ai ¡ ~ Bi
´2
;
where the second inequality follows from Lemma 4.1.
The unconditional variance thus satis¯es:
E
·
P(Ci = cA)P(Ci = cB)P(Ci = cN)
³








Lemma 4.1:Let c2 [0;1]. For any pair of real numbers a and b
c(1 ¡ c)(a + b)
2 · ca
2 + (1 ¡ c)b
2:
Proof. The left side of the inequality is c(1 ¡ c)(a2 + b2 + 2ab), which when subtracted
from both sides converts the inequality to
0 · c
2a
2 + (1 ¡ c)
2 b
2 ¡ 2c(1 ¡ c)ab = [ca ¡ (1 ¡ c)b]
2 :
31Proof of Proposition 5





for k = 2. Let N = 1 if t¡1 is the ¯rst




2 jN = 1
i
= µ¾1 + (1 ¡ µ)¾0 = E
h
(¢Pt)






2 jN = 2
i
= µ¾2 + (1 ¡ µ)¾0 = E
h
(¢Pt)














+ (1 ¡ µ)¾0:



































2 jN = 2
i
g: (A4:1)
From the formulae for the expected calendar period squared price change given the value of
N, (A4:1) equals
1
2f[µ¾1¾2 + (1 ¡ µ)¾2
0] ¡ (µ¾1 + (1 ¡ µ)¾0)(µ¾2 + (1 ¡ µ)¾0) + µ[µ¾2¾1 + (1 ¡ µ)¾2¾0]
+(1 ¡ µ)[µ¾0¾1 + (1 ¡ µ)¾2
0] ¡ (µ¾2 + (1 ¡ µ)¾0)(µ¾1 + (1 ¡ µ)¾0)g;
which is simpli¯ed as
1
2µ(1 ¡ µ)(¾1 ¡ ¾0)(¾2 ¡ ¾0): (A4:2)





























2 jN = 1
i´
g





















2 jN = 1
i´






2 jN = 1
i´






2 jN = 2
i´






2 jN = 2
i´
= µ(¹ ¾2 ¡ ¾1):











































Because ¾1 > ¾2, the second term of the covariance is negative (while the ¯rst term is
positive) and the covariance is positive if
(1 ¡ µ)(¾1 ¡ ¾0)(¾2 ¡ ¾0) >
µ
2 (¾1 ¡ ¾2)
2 : (A4:4)
First, by inspection
(¾1 ¡ ¾0) > (¾1 ¡ ¾2):
Thus to verify (A4:4), we need only show
(1 ¡ µ)(¾2 ¡ ¾0) >
µ
2 (¾1 ¡ ¾2):
Because
µ
2 (¾1 ¡ ¾2) = µ(¹ ¾2 ¡ ¾2), to verify the preceding inequality, we must show
(1 ¡ µ)(¾2 ¡ ¾0) ¡ µ(¹ ¾2 ¡ ¾2) > 0:
Condition 1 implies
(1 ¡ µ)(¾2 ¡ ¾0) > µ(1 ¡ µ)(¹ ¾2 ¡ ¾0):
Hence
(1 ¡ µ)(¾2 ¡ ¾0) ¡ µ(¹ ¾2 ¡ ¾2) > µ(1 ¡ µ)(¹ ¾2 ¡ ¾0) ¡ µ(¹ ¾2 ¡ ¾2):
The right-hand side of the preceding inequality equals
µ[(¾2 ¡ ¾0) ¡ µ(¹ ¾2 ¡ ¾0)];
and Condition 1 implies
(¾2 ¡ ¾0) ¡ µ(¹ ¾2 ¡ ¾0) > 0:
6.1
Proof of Proposition 6
If k = 3, then the covariance of calendar period squared price changes is larger for r = 1













3µf(1 ¡ µ)(¾1 ¡ ¾0)(¾3 ¡ ¾0)+µ(¹ ¾3 ¡ ¾1)(¹ ¾3 ¡ ¾3)+µ(¹ ¾3 ¡ ¾2)(¹ ¾3 ¡ ¾1)+µ(¹ ¾3 ¡ ¾3)(¹ ¾3 ¡ ¾2)g
The ¯rst term is positive, the second negative, and the remaing two terms are opposite in
sign and depend on the sign of (¹ ¾3 ¡ ¾2). We consider each of the three cases: (¹ ¾3 ¡ ¾2) > 0,
(¹ ¾3 ¡ ¾2) < 0, and (¹ ¾3 ¡ ¾2) = 0 in turn.
Case 1: (¹ ¾3 ¡ ¾2) > 0
If (¹ ¾3 ¡ ¾2) > 0, then ¾1 > ¹ ¾3 > ¾2 > ¾3 > ¾0. De¯ne d1 = ¾1 ¡ ¹ ¾3, d2 = ¹ ¾3 ¡ ¾2,






(1 ¡ µ)(¾1 ¡ ¾0)(¾3 ¡ ¾0)+µ(¹ ¾3 ¡ ¾3)(¹ ¾3 ¡ ¾2) > jµ(¹ ¾3 ¡ ¾1)(¹ ¾3 ¡ ¾3) + µ(¹ ¾3 ¡ ¾2)(¹ ¾3 ¡ ¾1)j;





d4 + µ(d2 + d3)d2 > µd1(2d2 + d3): (A5:1)
Rewrite (A5:1) as




d4 + µ(d2 + d3)d2 > d1µ(d2 + d3) + µd1d2:
If Condition 1 holds for period 3, then
(1 ¡ µ)d4 > µ(d2 + d3);
and (A5:1) is satisi¯ed if




d4 > µd1d2: (A5:2)
If Condition 1 holds for period 3, then
(1 ¡ µ)d4 > µd2;
and (A5:2) is satis¯ed if
µd2 (2d2 + d3) ¡ µd1d2 = µd2 (2d2 + d3 ¡ d1) = 0
From the de¯nition of ¹ ¾3,
P3
j=1(¾j ¡ ¹ ¾3) = d1 ¡ 2d2 ¡ d3, so
(2d2 + d3 ¡ d1) = 0:
Case 2: (¹ ¾3 ¡ ¾2) < 0
34If (¹ ¾3 ¡ ¾2) < 0, then ¾1 > ¾2 > ¹ ¾3 > ¾3 > ¾0. De¯ne d1 = ¾1 ¡ ¾2, d2 = ¾2 ¡ ¹ ¾3,






(1 ¡ µ)(¾1 ¡ ¾0)(¾3 ¡ ¾0)+µ(¹ ¾3 ¡ ¾1)(¹ ¾3 ¡ ¾2) > jµ(¹ ¾3 ¡ ¾1)(¹ ¾3 ¡ ¾3) + µ(¹ ¾3 ¡ ¾2)(¹ ¾3 ¡ ¾3)j;





d4 + µ(d1 + d2)d2 > µd3(2d2 + d1): (A5:3)
From the de¯nition of ¹ ¾3,
2d2 + d1 = d3;
so (A5:3) is satis¯ed if
(1 ¡ µ)d3d4 ¡ µd2
3 > 0:
Note (1 ¡ µ)d3d4 ¡ µd2
3 = d3(d4 ¡ µ(d3 + d4)). If Condition 1 holds for period 3
¾3 ¡ ¾0 > µ(¹ ¾3 ¡ ¾0);
which is equivalently expressed as
d4 > µ(d3 + d4):







(1 ¡ µ)(¾1 ¡ ¾0)(¾3 ¡ ¾0) > jµ(¹ ¾3 ¡ ¾1)(¹ ¾3 ¡ ¾3)j:
First, by inspection
(¾1 ¡ ¾0) > (¾1 ¡ ¹ ¾3):
Second, if Conditon 1 holds for period 3
(1 ¡ µ)(¾3 ¡ ¾0) > µ(¹ ¾3 ¡ ¾3):
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